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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a judgment of guilty. The state alleged that the defendant had 
violated I.C. § 18-918 by committing a battery upon Shilo High before S.Y., a minor child. The 
Magistrate Court heard argument and ordered that the defense not present any evidence of its 
case during the state's case and that after the state had rested the defense could make an offer of 
proof as to its proposed affirmative defenses and the judge would decide at that time if she would 
allow evidence to be presented on their elements. At trial, the Court sustained the state's 
objection on relevance grounds to questions about the custodial relationship between Shilo High 
and S.Y., and ruled that the "child in common" element of the crime would be satisfied by a 
showing that both parents were the biological parents of a child. After the state had rested, the 
defense presented the court with facts it would use to prove defense of another and the defense of 
necessity. The Court found that no reasonable view of the defense's proffer would support either 
defense. The jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant appealed the judgment. The 
District Court upheld the conviction. The defendant now appeals the District Court's 
Memorandum Opinion. 
B. Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts 
Deputy Solar Larsen of the Kootenai County Sheriffs Department arrested Troy Young, 
the defendant, for domestic battery upon Shilo High in the presence of a child on January 26, 
2013. Tr. Vol. I, p. 29, L. 15-24, Tr. Vol. II, p. 187, L. 13-25, p. 189, L. 1-5, p. 196, L. 1-25. At 
a pretrial motions hearing on March 27,2013, the Magistrate Court heard argument as to the 
defense's proffered affirmative defense instructions, and as to the admissibility of evidence 
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supporting the elements of those defenses. Tr. Vol. I, p. 18-24. The Court declined to rule at that 
hearing and told counsel it would rule the following day. !d. at p. 25. 
A trial was conducted before a jury on March 28,2013. Tr. Vol. I, p. 27. After voir dire, 
the jury was excused and the Magistrate Court informed counsel that the defense would be 
required to make an offer of proof after the state's case-in-chief as to whether a reasonable view 
of the evidence presented would support the defendant's affirmative defenses. [d. at p. 89, 100-
102. 
After preliminary instructions and the state's opening, the defense having reserved theirs, 
the first witness the prosecutor called was Shilo High. Tr. Vol. II, p. 120. Ms. High testified that 
the defendant was the biological father of her daughter S.Y.. Id. at p. 122. She testified that S.Y. 
was four years old. Id. 
The state then called Candice Rose. Tr. Vol. II, p. 123. Ms. Rose testified that Sherry 
Crothers was the adoptive mother ofS.Y. and her own mother. [d. at p. 125. She testified that 
Shilo High was her mother's cousin. Id. Ms. Rose explained that S.Y. was in the legal custody 
of Sherry Crothers. [d. 
Ms. Rose testified that on January 26,2013, she attended a birthday party for S.Y. at 
Triple Play in Hayden, Idaho. Tr. Vol. II, p. 125-26. At the party were a number of family 
members and friends. [d. at 125-29. At some point, a heated argument began between the 
defendant and Ms. Crothers. [d. at p. 133. The defendant was indicating that Shilo High had 
attempted to kill his child and was a drug addict. [d. at p. 145. The defendant demanded that 
Shilo High be drug tested. Id. at p. 184. Ms. Rose further testified that the defendant grabbed his 
girlfriend Tammy by the throat and mouth and told her to shut up when she chimed in. !d. at p. 
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145. However, this never appears in the video shown to the jury of the incident. Id. at p. 184. 
Ms. Rose testified she attempted to diffuse the situation. !d. at p. 137. 
Ms. Rose then testified that the defendant mounted stairs near the group. Tr. Vol. II, p. 
139. Ms. Rose testified that she heard the defendant say "f-this" and then run down the stairs 
toward Shilo. Id. at p. 172. Though on cross Ms. Rose testified that at that time Shilo High was 
playing with S. Y., it was shown on cross that she was watching the defendant. Id. at p. 171-73. 
Ms. Rose chased after the defendant and failed to stop him. !d. at p. 172. Ms. Rose testified that 
the defendant tackled Shilo High, and once on top of her yelled something she did not 
understand. Id. at p. 141. She testified she attempted to pull him off but he pushed her away. Id. 
at p. 140. She testified that he then left out the back door. Id. at p. 141. 
On cross, Ms. Rose testified that there is an ongoing custody battle between her mother 
and the defendant. Tr. Vol. II, p. 173-74. The defense attempted to elicit an answer to the 
question, "Who is S.y"s mother?" Id. at p. 175. The Magistrate Court removed the jury and 
stated that the defense may inquire, but upon another objection as to relevance from the state, and 
having heard argument from both parties, the Magistrate sustained the state's objection to the 
question. Id. at p. 175-76. Specifically, the judge ruled: 
THE COURT: I find it's a matter oflaw pursuant to Idaho Code 18-918(1)(a). For the 
purpose of this section, household member means a person who is a spouse, former 
spouse, or a person who has a child in common, regardless of whether they have been 
married, or a person with whom a person is cohabitating, whether or not they have been 
married, or have held themselves out to be husband or wife. 
- 3 -
By the plain meaning of the statutory provision, the Court would hold, at this time, the 
child in common in the plain meaning is not a factual determination - it's a factual 
determination of a child in common in the biological relationship, not in terms of the 
custodial factual basis. 
Id. at p. 177-78. 
Deputy Franssen of the Kootenai County Sheriff's Department testified. Tr. Vol. II p. 
209. The Deputy testified on cross examination that the defendant had told him that Shilo High 
was a drug addict who had almost killed S. Y. and recently lost another child due to her drug use, 
that he had been trying to get Sherry Crothers to have Ms. High drug tested, that during the 
argument on that subject he saw Ms. High start to remove S.Y. from the area, and that this 
caused him to see red. Tr. Vol. II p. 217-18. 
At the close of the state's case, the Court had the defense offer what it deemed would be 
proof that the defendant had acted in defense of his daughter and out of necessity. Tr. Vol. II, p. 
220-221. The defense provided the Court with the following additional information: 
JA Y LOGSDON: [W]e would be attempting to introduce evidence that Shilo High uh-
my client knew her to have a ongoing drug problem. That she had in the past been urn, 
labeled a hazard by Child Protection in Washington and not be allowed, without 
supervision, around the child. 
We were going to introduce evidence that he was aware uh, of her various suicide 
attempts. That she had made statement urn, whenever she tries to get off drugs, she gets 
suicidal. 
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That at one point she stole S. Y. 's medications, and then took them herself uh, supposedly 
to see what they were like. 
That at one point she decided, because the police had pulled her over and she had drugs in 
her car, she took all the drugs in the car at once before the police could get to her, and 
from that, overdosed. 
We were going to uh, then, also, introduce evidence that Sherry Crothers had told my 
client that at one point uh, Savan - or Shilo came to the house for a visit uh, took S.Y. 
with her out to a van and appeared to be trying to leave with her. That Sherry had come 
out, stop her and get the child back. 
So, those were the things we would have - we would expect to try to enter as to the 
reasons why my client was terrified for his child's life when he saw, at this party, S.Y. 
(sic) up, no drug test, attempt to leave with his child out a back door. 
It's our belief that at this point there's been no evidence that, that's not what happened. 
There was some evidence that was introduced by Candice to the contrary, but then after 
watching the video, it's quite clear that she has no idea what was happening at the time 
when my client was on the stairs looking out, uh, before he decided to go off and try to 
save his child. So, at this point that is a vacant space, except of course, the statements 
that he made to the Officer which are now part of the record. Thank you. 
Id. at p. 221-222. 
The state then took the position that it would be appropriate to allow the defendant to elicit this 
evidence and stated that the burden of production would be on the defense and the burden of 
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persuasion being on the state. !d. at p. 222-224. The Court decided to issue a ruling the next day. 
ld. 
The following day the Court ruled that neither of the defense's requested instructions on 
the affinnative defenses of defense of another and necessity may be offered. Tr. Vol. II, p. 229-
236. The Court found that Ms. High may have attempted to leave with S.Y. ld. at p. 234, L. 1-3. 
As to the defense of another instruction, the Court found that the defense required a threat of 
bodily hann, not mere hann, to be imminent. !d. at 233, L. 6-25. Therefore, the Court found that 
the defense's offer did meet the required element. ld. The Court further found that no reasonable 
view of the evidence made the defendant's actions necessary.ld. at p. 234. The Court listed a 
number of alternatives that the defendant might have taken, and referred to the presence of other 
people in the area. ld. 
On similar grounds the Court rejected the necessity defense instruction. The Court found 
that there were less offensive alternatives and listed a number of examples. ld. at p. 236. 
The defense argued again that the issues that the Court believed foreclosed were best left 
to a jury to detennine what was reasonable. ld. at p. 237, L. 17-25, p. 238, L. 1-11. 
The Court having made its rulings, the defense rested.ld. at p. 237, L. 13-15. Closings 
were given. !d. at p. 263-282. The jury found the defendant gUilty. ld. at p. 280. The defendant 
timely filed a notice of appeal under LC.R. 54. 1 (a), et.seq. from the judgment of the Court. 
The District Court heard argument on September 23,2013. The state never argued that 
the defendant had failed to provide evidence of a specific threat for purposes of a necessity 
defense, and the Court referred to the issue as being how immediate the threat was by making 
reference to State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870 (Ct.App.2005). Tr.Appeal, p. 6. On October 3,2013, 
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the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion upholding the defendant's conviction. The District 
Court found that "the term 'child in common' does not depend upon a person's legal rights to 
custody of a child." The Court further found that to give the defense of another instruction, there 
must have been an imminent threat of bodily harm. Prevention of a felony would not suffice. 
Lastly, the Court found that the necessity defense was properly refused along with the evidence 
supporting it because the Court found that no evidence of any specific threat had been provided 
to the trial court in the defendant's offer of proof. The Court did not issue any ruling on whether 
the Magistrate Court had erred in weighing the evidence and finding that reasonable alternative 
actions were available to the defendant. The defendant timely filed a notice of appeal from the 
District Court's Memorandum Opinion. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. The defendant was denied his right to fully present a defense and his right to a 
trial by jury as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Art. I §§ 7, 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
II. Whether the state must prove that the defendant and the alleged victim have an 
ongoing relationship with a child to convict someone of domestic battery 
predicated on the "child in common" qualifier. 
III. Whether to raise the affirmative defense of self defense or defense of another a 
defendant must how that the harm to be avoided was bodily injury or if the 
prevention of a felony suffices. 
IV. Whether a trial court is called upon to weigh evidence when determining whether 
an instruction may be given. 
V. Whether the District Court may find sua sponte find error in the lower court's 
rulings. 
VI. Whether the facts presented to the trial court, including but not limited to the 
defendant's knowledge of or belief in the alleged victim's previous attempt to 
kidnap his daughter, her drug addiction, her suicidal tendencies, her violent 
tendencies, and the fact that the defendant saw the alleged victim hurrying his 
child toward and exit door during an argument that had distracted everyone else in 
the area amounted to a "specific threat" capable of supporting an instruction for 





In East's Pleas of the Crown, the author, considering what sort of an attack it was 
lawful and justifiable to resist, even by the death of the assailant, says: 'A man 
may repel force by force in defense of his person, habitation, or property against 
one who manifestly intends and endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a 
known felony, such as murder, rape, robbery, arson, burglary, and the like, upon 
either. In these cases he is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary 
until he has secured himself from all danger; and if he kill him in so doing it is 
called justifiable self-defense; as, on the other hand, the killing by such felon of 
any person so lawfully defending himself will be murder. But a bare fear of any of 
these offenses, however well grounded,-as that another lies in wait to take away 
the party's life,-unaccompanied with any overt act indicative of such an intention, 
will not warrant in killing that other by way of prevention. There must be an 
actual danger at the time.' Page 271. 
Beardv. Us., 158 U.S. 550,562 (1895). Thus, even prior to the revolution, Americans were 
accustomed to the law's recognition oftheir right to defend themselves and that which they held 
dear. The people of the United States lived long under tyranny, and their wish to be able to 
defend themselves free of encumbrance survives, in part, in the Second Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. However, when the state ofIdaho was founded, those who 
wrote its Constitution, recognizing the importance of preventing government from robbing 
citizens of the right to defending themselves, grounded that right into the first words of the 
document. And so, Article I § 1 of the Idaho Constitution opens with the statement: 
All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among 
which are enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and 
protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing safety. 
The District Court in this case erred when it upheld the Magistrate's denial of the defendant's 
right to present his defenses to the jury, and thereby violated his right to present a defense and his 
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right to have the jury decide his guilt. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI; IDAHO CONST. art. I §§ 7, 
13. 
B. Standard for Review 
Whether the jury has been instructed properly is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65 (1992). In determining whether the trial 
court should have given a requested jury instruction, this Court must examine the instructions 
that were given and the evidence adduced at trial. State v. Fetterly, 126 Idaho 475, 476 
(Ct.App.1994). 
The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the province of the trial 
court. A trial court's determination as to the admission of evidence at trial will only be reversed 
where there has been an abuse of that discretion. State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 973-74 
(1992). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; 
and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 
115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). 
C. The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's refusal of the defendant's defense 
instructions and exclusion of evidence supporting those defenses. 
The trial court is required to charge the jurors with all matters necessary for their 
information so that the jury may be correctly informed with respect to the nature and elements of 
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the crime charged and any essential legal principles applicable to the evidence admitted. State v. 
Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 758 (Ct.App.1992). A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on 
every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence. State v. Hansen, 133 
Idaho 323, 328 (Ct.App.1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-2132(a) requires that the trial court must state to the jury being charged 
"all matters of law necessary for their information," and must give a requested jury instruction if 
it determines that instruction to be correct and pertinent. Under a four-part test, a requested 
instruction must be given where: (1) it properly states the governing law; (2) a reasonable view of 
the evidence would support the defendant's legal theory; (3) it is not addressed adequately by 
other jury instructions; and (4) it does not constitute an impermissible comment as to the 
evidence. Fetterly, 126 Idaho at 476-77; State v. Evans, 119 Idaho 383,385 (Ct.App.1991). To 
meet the second prong of this test, the defendant must present at least some evidence supporting 
his theory, and any support will suffice as long as his theory comports with a reasonable view of 
the evidence. Fetterly, 126 Idaho at 476-77; Kodesh, 122 Idaho at 758. If the foregoing criteria 
are met, but the requested instruction incorrectly states the law, the trial court is "under the 
affirmative duty to properly instruct the jury." State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 91 (1992). 
However, the United States Supreme Court, in addressing a Sixth Amendment 
Compulsory Process Clause claim, has held that in order to establish a violation of the 
constitutional right to present evidence, a defendant "must at least make some plausible showing 
of how [the] testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense." United 
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982). In addressing the materiality standard, 
the United States Supreme Court explained: 
- 11 -
The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the 
justice of the finding of guilt.... This means that the omission must be evaluated in 
the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether 
or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new 
trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, 
additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a 
reasonable doubt. 
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 868 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 
(1976)). Similarly, the Idaho Appellate Court has stated, in addressing a Sixth Amendment 
compulsory process claim, that "[i]n constitutional terms, evidence is material if it would create a 
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that did not otherwise exist." State v. Garza, 109 
Idaho 40, 43 (Ct.App.1985). 
Further, "the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to 
present a complete defense,' " Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California 
v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). In In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) the Supreme 
Court described the right of an individual to "be heard in his defense - a right to his day in court" 
as one of the most "basic" ingredients of due process oflaw. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 
14, 19 (1967), the Court similarly explained that "the right to present a defense" is a 
"fundamental element of due process of law." This right has been held to include the right to 
present evidence going to the issue of guilt (see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)); 
the right to present evidence relevant to sentencing (Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979)); and 
the right of a defendant to testifY in his or her own behalf (see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 
(1987)). See also Crane, 476 U.S. at 690 (discussing constitutional guarantee ofa "meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense" and "an opportunity to be heard"). All of these rights 
are designed to ensure a fair procedure at which the defendant is allowed to present his side of 
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the case - whether his side relates to refuting an element of the offense or to establishing a 
relevant affirmative defense. See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (reversing conviction 
based on state judge's interference with the defendant's right "to present his own witnesses to 
establish a defense"). See generally Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An 
Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 713 (1976). 
Even in the civil context, the Court has held repeatedly that due process carries with it a 
basic right "to be heard." Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971); Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. (78 U.S.) 223, 233 (1863). As 
the Court explained in Logan: this right requires "an opportunity ... granted at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner for [aJ heating appropriate to the nature ofthe case." Logan, 455 
U.S. at 137 (citations omitted). The Court has held that defendants have a right to present all 
available defenses. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 
287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932)). 
The right to present a defense carries with it, of course, the right to have the trier of fact 
consider the proffered defense. Thus, in Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972), Marilyn 
Cool's defense turned on the testimony of one Robert Voyles, her alleged accomplice. At Cool's 
trial, Voyles testified that he alone was guilty of the crime charged and that Cool had nothing to 
do with the crime. The trial judge gave the jury an "accomplice instruction" which provided that 
accomplice testimony is "open to suspicion" but that if the jury is convinced that Voyles's 
testimony "is true beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should give it the same effect as you 
would to a witness not in any respect implicated in the alleged crime." Id. at 102. In reversing 
Cool's conviction, this Court held that this instruction concerning one of the defense witnesses 
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violated, among other rights, the defendant's rights to present evidence as recognized in 
Washington v. Texas. The Court explained that the "instruction given below impermissibly 
obstructs the exercise of that right by totally excluding relevant evidence unless the jury makes a 
preliminary determination that it is extremely reliable." 409 U.S. at 104. 
In this case, the lower Court took issue with the defendant's view of what he may defend 
his child from, and what a reasonable person would have believed. The Magistrate was incorrect 
on both counts, as will be shown below. The District Court upon review of the Magistrate's 
decisions agreed with the Magistrate as to what one may defend another against, but sustained 
the denial of the defendant's proffered necessity defense on a separate basis, namely, that the 
District Court did not see any evidence in the record that a specific threat had been identified by 
the defense. 
i. The District Court erred in finding that self defense requires that the jury find 
imminent danger of bodily harm, rather than harm. 
At trial, the defense presented a modified version of the Idaho Criminal Judicial 
Instruction 1517. The Court found the modification from "bodily harm" to "harm" improper. 
The District Court upheld this ruling. This was in error. The len is based upon I.C. §§ 18-4009, 
18-4010 and 18-4013. These statutes address defenses in cases of homicide, but they are similar 
to the other self defense statutes in Idaho. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-202A. All of them state a variation 
of: 
Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in either of the 
following cases: 
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to 
do some great bodily injury upon any person; ... 
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Thus, the citizens ofIdaho, much like the early colonists from England, enjoy a right to defend 
themselves and others from the perpetration of felonies. Kidnapping is a felony. See I.C. §§ 18-
4501, 18-4502, and 18-4503. Therefore, the law protected the defendant's right to defend his 
daughter from being kidnapped. 
The District and Magistrate Court both relied on the limited language provided in the 
Idaho Criminal Judicial Instruction rather than the the law of defense of another. It is the law, 
and not the example instruction, that controls this defendant's fate. 1 This Court should overrule 
the lower Courts' refusals to allow the defendant's defense of another instruction and remand for 
a new trial. 
ii. The Magistrate Court erred in imposing the judge's own belief as to what is 
reasonable in the place of the jurors' and therefore refusing to allow the 
defendant to present a defense. 
The Magistrate Court refused both defenses on the grounds that it did not believe a 
reasonable view of the evidence supported the instructions. Tr. Vol. II, p. 229-236. The Court 
listed a number of options available to the defendant at the time of the incident. However, as the 
defense argued, the reasonability of the alternatives the Court proposed was capable of dispute. 
Id. at p. 237, L. 17-25, p. 238, L. 1-11. The District Court took no position on the matter. 
I It is worth noting that len 1514 provides that homicide is justified if: 
"committed in defense of habitation, property or person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by 
violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or 
tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any person therein. 
However, the bare fear of such acts is not sufficient unless the circumstances are sufficient to create such a fear in a 
reasonable person and the defendant acted under the influence of such fears alone" 
It would be a strange law indeed if it permitted a person to kill to prevent a felony but determined that any lesser 
measures were criminal acts. 
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The crux of the problem is that the lower Court misconstrued the "reasonable view of the 
evidence" requirement to mean what would be reasonable from the trial judge's perspective. I.C. 
§ 19-2132(a) did not change the common law standard the required that a defense be given if any 
evidence existed as to each element. Hansen, 133 Idaho at 328. The "reasonable view" standard 
is simply a different way of saying that at least some evidence must reasonably support the 
instruction. It does not mean that the Court may weigh the evidence and make the actual 
determination of factual reasonableness in the place of the jury. 
This Court should compare this with the scope of review for sufficiency of evidence to 
support a conviction. The Idaho Court of Appeals has found that in when reviewing a denied 
motion for acquittal: 
[the Court] independently review[s] the evidence to determine whether a 
reasonable mind could conclude that the defendant's guilt on every material 
element of the offense of which he stands convicted had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt by substantial and competent evidence. [The Court] do[es] not 
substitute [its] view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the 
weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable interferences to be drawn 
from the evidence. Where the defendant stands convicted, [the Court] view[s] all 
reasonable inferences in the state's favor. 
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862 (Ct.App.2004) citing State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 395 
(Ct.App.2000); State. v. Kapsa, 126 Idaho 512, 521 (Ct.App.l994); State v. Mata, 107 Idaho 
863, 866 (Ct.App.1984). Similarly, when deciding whether to allow the defendant to provide a 
defense, the Court may not decide for the jury what reasonable inferences are to be drawn from 
the evidence. The Court is required to ensure that an instruction that is supported by no evidence 
is not given, not that instructions be kept out because the Court does not feel the defense 
reasonable. That is a direct violation of the defendant's right to a trial by jury. As the United 
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States Supreme Court has held: 
In sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the history upon which 
they rely, confirms the opinion that we expressed in Jones. Other than the fact of a 
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to ajury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. With that exception, we endorse the statement of the rule set 
forth in the concurring opinions in that case: "[I]t is unconstitutional for a 
legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the 
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is 
equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 526 U.S., at 252-253 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); see also id., at 253 
(opinion of SCALIA, J.). 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000); citing Jones v. US., 526 U.S. 227 (1999). It 
is for the jury to assess the defendant's requested defenses in view of the facts. 
The lower Court's ruling also failed to take into consideration cases allowing defenses 
similar to that offered here. In State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854 (1990), the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that a defendant may produce evidence at trial that it was necessary for her to use marijuana 
to ease her pain. The Court closed with these lines: 
We hold that Lynn Hastings is entitled to present evidence at trial on the common 
law defense of necessity. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether or not she 
has met the elements of that defense. 
ld . . at 856. The Court also cited as persuasive authority State v. Boettcher, 443 N.W.2d 1 
(S.D.1989), a case involving "a mother fear[ing] that her daughter was being sexually abused in 
her grandparents' home, [who] was allowed to raise the necessity defense to charges of burglary, 
assault and kidnapping." ld. It is unlikely then that the lower Court's ruling in this case 
comported with the law of this state, for certainly mothers have other options besides breaking 
into homes and assaulting and kidnapping their owners. What action is reasonable under the 
circumstances or a viable alternative is an inference that must be left to the trier of fact. 
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In this case, the Court refused two instructions and excluded evidence of the defendant's 
defense because the Court did not believe that the defendant's actions were reasonable or the 
least offensive alternative under the circumstances. This holding was a misapplication of the law 
and a violation of the defendant's right to present a complete defense and have the facts 
determined by the jury. Therefore, the lower Court's ruling must be reversed, and the case 
remanded for a new trial. 
iii. The District Court erred in sua sponte finding no evidence of a specific threat and 
upholding the Magistrate's denial of the defendant's requested necessity defense 
instruction on that basis. 
Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. 
State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195 (1992). Where a party appeals the decision of an intermediate 
appellate court, the appellant may not raise issues that are different from issues presented to the 
intermediate court. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275 (2003). An issue is different ifit is not 
substantially the same or does not sufficiently overlap with an issue raised before the trial court. 
See id. at 277-78. To illustrate, the Idaho Supreme Court in Sheahan determined that even where 
the primary arguments made at trial were that unfair pretrial publicity and community prejudice 
deprived the defendant of a fair trial, the trial judge had considered all of the arguments on the 
issue of a fair trial made by the defendant on appeal. The Court stated, "The trial judge 
recognized and addressed these issues as falling within the factors to be considered," and thus, 
they were preserved. Id. at 278. In other words, the issues raised on appeal, though expanded 
upon, were substantially the same as those argued before the trial court. 
In this case, the trial court did consider the offer of proof and found that while a threat 
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had been perceived by the defendant, his reaction was unreasonable. The District Court 
disagreed, saying that no threat existed. That issue was not briefed by the parties or argued 
before the District Court. The District Court had mentioned thinking that there was a question of 
how immediate the threat would have been, but the immediacy of the threat and whether there 
was a specific threat are quite different issues. The District Court plainly erred in making its 
ruling on its proffered basis. 
Even if this Court were to find the District Court's ruling not improper on the basis of it 
not being raised as an issue by either party, the fact remains that a specific threat was clearly 
presented by the defense. The facts presented to the trial court were the alleged victim's previous 
kidnapping attempt of the same child as in this case, her drug addiction, her suicidal tendencies, 
her violent tendencies, and the fact that she was walking the defendant's child toward an exit 
door during an argument that occupied the attention of the rest of the people attending the scene. 
It is difficult to square the District Court's ruling with the reality of the situation presented to the 
defendant as a loving father. There should be no question that these facts amounted to a 
"specific threat" of kidnapping capable of supporting giving the instruction for a necessity 




The Magistrate Court erred in finding that the element of "household member" could be 
fulfilled merely by a showing that the defendant and the alleged victim were the biological 
parents of the same child and that therefore evidence of the alleged victim's relationship with the 
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child and defendant was irrelevant. The Court's ruling runs afoul of precedent relating to the 
rationality ofI.C. § 18-918, and must be reversed. 
B. Standard of Review 
Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 
(2010); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,214 (Ct.App.2009). Therefore, when considering 
admission of evidence of other acts, an appellate court exercises free review of the trial court's 
relevancy determination. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214. 
C. The Court erred in determining that the statutory requirement that the defendant and Ms. 
High have a child in common was met with proof that Ms. High and the defendant were 
the biological parents of the same child 
I. C. § 18-918(1)( a) states in relevant part: 
"Household member" means a person who is a spouse, former spouse, or a person 
who has a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or a 
person with whom a person is cohabiting, whether or not they have married or 
have held themselves out to be husband or wife. 
The Magistrate Court held that to have a child in common merely meant that both parents be the 
biological parent of the child. This limitation on the scope of the definition has no basis in the 
statute and is in conflict with the precedents of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
In State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 830-831 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
The domestic relationship is a unique relationship. Even when the parties no 
longer share the relationship the law may impose obligations, such as alimony, 
child support, or child custody arrangements, which require the parties to continue 
to interact and to do so on a highly emotional level. Because of the nature of the 
relationship there is an increased opportunity for violence to occur and continue. 
The decision of the legislature to extend additional protection to household 
members is rationally related to the state's interest in preventing violence between 
those involved in some type of domestic relationship. Thus, we hold that I.C. § 
18-918(3) does not violate equal protection. 
The Court's holding would be in error ifthe statute is defined in the limited way the District 
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Court ruled in this case. The law cannot single out for increased punishment those who have a 
produced a child when one or both has no further relationship with the child or the other person. 
The reasoning used by the Idaho Supreme Court does not apply to such circumstances. 
In State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 867 (2011), the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
In determining legislative intent, this Court applies the maxim noscitur a sociis, 
which means "a word is known by the company it keeps." State v. Hammersley, 
134 Idaho 816, 821 (2000). Here, all examples of "household member" preceding 
the ambiguous phrase-"spouse, former spouse, or a person who has a child in 
common regardless of whether they have been married"--denote a marital or 
intimate relationship. L C. § 18-918( 1)( a). In addition, the phrase at issue is 
followed by the qualifying phrase "whether or not they have married or have held 
themselves out to be husband or wife." Id That qualifying phrase indicates 
legislative intent that "a person with whom a person is cohabiting" is to add to the 
definitional list any intimate relationships that do not rise to the marital or co-
parental statuses already listed, such as boyfriend-girlfriend relationships. Indeed, 
if the Legislature had intended "cohabiting" to include anyone living under the 
same roof, regardless of relationship, there would be no need for the qualifying 
phrase at all. 
Again, the Court focuses on the relationship between the defendant apd the alleged victim. 
Domestic violence is something that occurs between those in an intimate relationship or who at 
least have shared responsibilities for the raising of a child. Where that relationship has ceased to 
exist, it cannot be said that the parties have the child "in common." The child belongs to one 
party. The other person may, as here, only exist as a possible threat to that child's well-being. 
To give that biological parent special protections is contrary to the purpose of the law. 
The District Court's ruling seems to imply that all biological parents have a relationship 
that requires them to continue to interact and do so at a highly emotional level. That obviously is 
not true. The world is replete with biological parents who have neither the possibility of actual 
or legal relationships with their child or the other parents (biological and otherwise). Thus, the 
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words "have in common" generally denote something actively had jointly by the parties. See 
Merriam Webster Dictionary (2013). Where one parent does not have a parental relationship 
with the child, it cannot be said that they "have" the child. The state presumably does not have 
an interest in providing extra protection to those who simply wish to "have" the child or once 
"had" the child but lost the child due, undoubtedly, to their own actions. Such protection would 
hardly be in the interest of the child, the legitimate parent, or society. 
This Court should hold that to "ha[ ve] a child in common" is the designation of an 
enduring relationship. The jury must decide whether under the particular circumstances of the 
case that relationship exists. Where the biological mother, as here, no longer has any ties to the 
child and is in fact viewed as detrimental to its well-being, it cannot be said she "has a child in 
common" with the defendant. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the lower Court's holding and remand for a new trial 
where evidence of the relationship between Shilo High and S.Y. may be introduced to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The case before this Court requires it to reaffirm a defendant's right to have his innocence 
or guilt decided by a group of his peers. This Court should reverse the conviction and order the 
lower court to allow evidence of his defenses, to instruct the jury on the defenses offered if that 
evidence is in the record at close of trial, and to allow evidence to be elicited as to the 
relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim. 
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